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COMMENT

DISCOUNTING, ON STILTS
Douglas A. Kysar∗
Jeremy Bentham famously described the concept of natural law rights as
“nonsense on stilts.”1 This Comment argues that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of public
policy—a contemporary applied version of Bentham’s utilitarianism—is also nonsensical
in that CBA purports to resolve questions, the answers to which have already been
subsumed within the framework’s architecture. In particular, CBA subsumes vital
questions of intergenerational equity through its use of an exponential discount factor to
adjust future costs and benefits to a present value. This discounting procedure has the
practical effect of dramatically diminishing the apparent significance of policy effects on
future generations in the context of problems such as climate change, species extinction,
deforestation, and aquifer depletion. Indeed, the impact of discounting future costs and
benefits to a present value tends to swamp all other variables within such long-term
policy analyses.2 Accordingly, arguments in favor of the use and selection of a discount
rate for CBA calculation deserve close inspection.3
As it turns out, the conventional justifications offered for the use of discounting in
the intergenerational context do not withstand scrutiny. Moreover, although some
analysts are careful to acknowledge the need to address questions of intergenerational
equity directly through other policy mechanisms,4 these analysts understate the difficulty
of limiting discounted CBA to its proper sphere of competence. The formal language of
CBA offers the promise—but not the reality—of compounding all relevant reasons for
deciding into its calculations, including the needs and interests of future generations.
Because ex post monetary transfers are thought to compensate for any residual interests
that CBA has failed to incorporate into its calculations, policymakers and commentators
are invited to believe that CBA can resolve most any social dilemma without the need for
openly moral judgments concerning fairness or justice. Naturally, when faced with a
dauntingly complex and morally inflected policy conundrum such as climate change, the
∗
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temptation to delegate responsibility to the calculative process in this manner is
overwhelming. Yet, as this Comment argues, the compensatory transfers that are thought
to sanitize the CBA procedure in the intergenerational context are deeply problematic,
both in their conception and in their amenability to concrete realization.
The organizers of the Intergenerational Equity and Intergenerational Discounting
conference and the editors of the University of Chicago Law Review have done the legal
academy a tremendous service by soliciting and publishing the papers included in this
issue, which include contributions from prominent legal scholars, economists, and
philosophers and which cover a range of views on the purpose and practice of
discounting. Nevertheless, as this Comment argues, a great deal of analytical confusion
remains in the literature. In the end, the most important claim in the set of papers is also
the one least served by discounted CBA: “If respecting future generations means
anything, it should mean respecting our best guess as to their wishes and helping them as
much as feasible.”5 Perhaps with the publication of these papers, legal scholars and others
interested in long-term policymaking will finally be able to put aside debates over
discounting and focus instead on the more important task of conceiving and realizing
equitable relations between human generations.
I. DISCOUNTING RESOURCES
Although discounting is most controversial when applied to human lives,6 the
procedure also turns out to be problematic when applied to ordinary resources. In that
respect, many of the general arguments that have been offered in defense of the use of
discounting in the intergenerational policy context can be dismissed summarily. For
instance, the possibility that future generations may not come into existence due to
extinction—which sometimes is used to provide an analytical foundation for
discounting7—offers little comfort in contexts where the likelihood that future
generations will survive is itself a function of policy choices that are being made through
discounted welfare analysis. Similarly, the absurd or paradoxical results that are said to
flow from a refusal to discount8 fail as defenses of discounting because they assume prior
adherence by society to a mathematical optimization procedure, when in fact the very
question being posed is whether intergenerational decisionmaking is best managed
through that type of social choice mechanism.
Also problematic are justifications for discounting that are premised on the
observed rate of time preference. As Robert Hahn has described it, “[t]he basic rationale
for discounting is that consumers are not indifferent between consuming a dollar’s worth
of a good today and one dollar next year; discount rates are necessary to reflect this
5
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preference.”9 However, by taking revealed preference as the exclusive standard for
welfare analysis, these justifications fail to acknowledge the fact that a traditional and
often quite popular role of democratic government has been precisely to counteract the
influence of consumer impatience.10 Such a role may be all the more important when the
interests of future generations are at stake, since members of those generations suffer an
even greater tyranny of the present than the currently living.
CBA proponents sometimes respond to this preference-overriding point by
making plain their political commitments: “[O]verriding market prices on ethical grounds
opens the door to irreconcilable inconsistencies. If ethical arguments, rather than the
revealed preferences of citizens, form the rationale for a low discount rate cannot ethical
arguments be applied to other questions?”11 Nowhere in this line of argument, however,
has the CBA proponent explained why the observed impatience of individual members of
one generation should govern the consumption opportunities left available to future
generations. In truth, a need for “ethical arguments” and an “overriding” of preferences
are inevitable no matter how the present generation proceeds, since the rate of time
preference of future generations cannot be observed.
Moreover, even if future generations’ rate of time preference could be observed,
CBA practitioners have not explained why the relevant period of discounting should
commence at the moment of calculation, before the lives of future generations have even
begun. If one is truly following the rationale of respecting individuals’ preferences, then
discounting of future costs and benefits should only begin and extend for the time period
that the individuals affected by policy proposals are actually alive and experiencing
impatience. The cost-benefit analyst instead adopts a constant rate and an uninterrupted
period of discount because she has entertained a subtle conceptual shift from individual
preferences to collective welfare impacts. In essence, she has adopted a less transparent
version of the infinitely lived individual from Cass Sunstein and Arden Rowell’s
Methuselahville example,12 treating all members of future generations as if they were a
single, collective interest-holder. But it is difficult to imagine why future generations’
would consent to being treated as if their lives were already in decline when they never
enjoyed the period of youthful extravagance that was gained at their current expense. For
these and other reasons, many thoughtful commentators have concluded that discounting
for pure rate of time preference across generations is simply indefensible.13
9

See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U.
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Defenses of discounting that are premised on opportunity costs are more plausible
than the justifications just discussed.14 By discounting future costs and benefits according
to the rate of return available for alternative uses of public funds, policymakers are
thought to ensure that future generations will be left with an endowment of resources that
has taken advantage of the best available investment opportunities. Louis Kaplow puts
the point more succinctly: “Discounting dollars is justified because the market discount
rate is a price that signifies resource costs just like any other price.”15 Moreover, as
Samida and Weisbach argue, the opportunity costs characterization suggests that the
practice of discounting in the intergenerational context may in fact be “required by any
moral theory that accepts the Pareto criterion.”16 This is because any policy expenditure
that fails discounted CBA could instead be devoted to alternative investments, the
proceeds of which could in part be used to compensate those who are harmed by rejection
of the policy.
Nevertheless, the opportunity costs defense of discounting in the intergenerational
context also fails for a variety of reasons. First, in order to sustain what would otherwise
amount to a gross conflation between potential and actual Pareto improvements—
between Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency—these justifications assume that sufficient
intergenerational resource transfers will be undertaken to ensure that future generations
are left better off even after their interests have been exponentially discounted.17 The
precise manner in which such transfers are to be undertaken is generally left unstated or
is relegated to the same “political process” dustbin that often is used to address matters of
intragenerational equity.18 Worse still, some analysts revert to a conjuring trick in which
compensatory transfers are deemed unnecessary to forgive our future sins, given the
legacy of economic growth and technological progress that analysts are confident we will
bequeath to future generations, so long as public regulators simply stay out of the way.19
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004)); Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 941, 998 (1999) (describing “[t]he ethically compromised status of discounting for time
preference at a constant rate” across, rather than within, generations); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
287 (1971) (stating that “from a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting future well-being
on the basis of pure time preference”).
14
See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 17] (observing that “the dominant approach” in setting
the rate of discount for policy evaluation looks to market rates of interest that reflect the opportunity costs
of displacing private capital investment).
15

Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice
and Efficiency, __ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2006) [Draft at 4].
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Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 2].
Samida and Weisbach, for instance, state that “[t]he main assumption made by the [Pareto
dominance] theorem that might affect its application to intergenerational projects is that it assumes that the
tax and transfer system can be adjusted to offset the effects of the project.” Samida & Weisbach, supra note
__ [Draft at 20].
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See Robert N. Stavins et al., Interpreting Sustainability in Economic Terms: Dynamic Efficiency
Plus Intergenerational Equity, 79 ECON. LETTERS 339, 341 (2003).
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Along these lines, Viscusi observes that future generations are likely to be “more affluent and
better off economically than we are,” and therefore asserts that “[t]he current citizenry . . . might not be too
moved by the plight of their more affluent, distant descendants.” Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 2]. See
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Like the occasional technological pessimism of environmentalists, this “trickle forward”
defense of discounting is more of a mood than an argument.
Even viewed charitably, the argument misfires for, as Geoffrey Heal points out, it
“is not an intertemporal judgment, but rather an interpersonal one.”20 That is, the
argument seeks to discount impacts on future generations, not because they will happen
in the future, but because they will happen to individuals who are wealthier than those
who presently exist. This point is made plain in Kip Viscusi’s contribution, when the
author observes that if willingness-to-pay to reduce risks to life were adjusted for
economic growth (perhaps on the theory that the demand for safety is elastic with
income21), then society would be required to greatly favor lifesaving in the future under
certain plausible assumptions regarding the discount rate and the value of a statistical
life.22 Viscusi objects to this conclusion by stating that “[t]here is no valid economic
rationale for this preferential treatment of future generations.”23 But in fact the economic
rationale is plain: If the goal of public policymaking is simply the maximization of social
welfare, and if the chosen mode of analysis fails to account for the declining marginal
utility of income in its use of willingness-to-pay measures for the value of life, then it
follows ineluctably that richer generations’ lives count more in the social welfare
function than poorer. Viscusi is in fact objecting to the clear implication of the economic
rationale, not to its absence.
Second, to give the compensatory transfer argument practical significance in the
environmental context, states would need to develop some more or less comprehensive
system of national accounting to ensure that the resource base to support future wellbeing actually is being expanded (or at least preserved) for the benefit of future
generations. At present, the danger is too great that consumption may be confused for
investment, that environmental externalities may be inadequately accounted for, and that
many important natural resources and ecosystem services may be absent from national
ledgers altogether.24 Moreover, if the system of environmental accounting revealed that
the total capital stock was not being preserved adequately for the benefit of future
generations—as many expect it would25—then some socially controlled mechanism of
also R.C. Lind, Intergenerational Equity, Discounting, and the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 ENERGY
POLICY 379 (1995) (“[I]n all likelihood future generations will be much richer than the present one and if
they (future generations) want lower levels of greenhouse gases and lower temperature levels they should
pay for them.”). Even John Rawls, who deserves credit for reviving interest in the problem of
intergenerational justice, seemed to implicitly assume a unidirectional upward trend in progress and wellbeing. See RAWLS, supra note __, at 287 (suggesting that the condition of not knowing to which generation
one belongs is equivalent to not knowing which stage of civilization one will experience).
20
Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, __ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2006).
21
See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note __.
22
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23
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24

See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 675
(2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43
BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1 (2001).
25

See infra text accompanying notes __-__.
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intergenerational capital transfer would be required in order to satisfy the Pareto criterion
or, alternatively, in order to guarantee a minimum sustainable level of well-being for all
generations across time. The task of designing and implementing such an
intergenerational transfer mechanism would, in turn, necessitate societal discussion
regarding the most reliable method of accomplishing intergenerational transfers and the
precise composition of the resource base that is to be left for the benefit of posterity.
Along those lines, Dexter Samida and David Weisbach suggest that all methods
of transferring resources intergenerationally may be equally likely to be undone by
intervening generations.26 Their suggestion, however, entails a commensurated view of
the world that the public may not, in fact, widely share: When past generations
designated miles of extraordinary lakeshore real estate in the city of Chicago for public
purposes, they altered the social meaning of that resource in a way that made it more
resistant to raiding by intervening generations. By designating the Chicago lakeshore a
“Public Ground — Common to Remain Forever Open, Clear, and Free of Any Buildings,
or Other Obstruction Whatever,”27 the planners of Chicago’s lakeshore made its
continued preservation a matter of intergenerational distributive equity, rather than
market allocative efficiency—a cultural “coding” that rendered the space less amenable
to characterization as a resource that could be used more profitably in some other
manner. In the process, those planners also made an openly normative judgment
regarding the kind of city, and the kind of lives, that they believed Chicago and its
residents should embody.
Discounters tend to reject such resource- and value-specific intergenerational
planning on the theory that perfect substitutability exists among the varieties of human
and natural capital. Thus, Kaplow argues that “it is incomplete and potentially misleading
to suggest that the present generation does (or does not) have an obligation to a future
generation to do one specific thing or another, such as cleaning up the environment,
conserving nonrenewable resources, or avoiding accumulation of a large debt.”28
Similarly, Sunstein and Rowell assert that “there is no abstract reason to believe that
preserving a particular environmental amenity (a forest, a lake) is always better for
posterity than other investments that do not involve the environment in particular
(expenditures on basic research, reductions in national debt).”29 In short, so long as
capital of any description is retained in sufficient amounts to support a theoretically
nondeclining stream of welfare, discounters tend to believe that society can remain
26

Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 18].
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Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 24]. See also Arrow et al., supra note __, at 151
(“Even if some resources such as stocks of minerals are drawn down along a consumption path, the
sustainability criterion could nevertheless be satisfied if other capital assets were accumulated sufficiently
to offset the resource decline.”); Robert M. Solow, An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainability, 19
RESOURCES POL’Y 162, 168 (1993) (“The duty imposed by sustainability is to bequest to posterity not any
particular thing . . . but rather to endow them with whatever it takes to achieve a standard of living at least
as good as our own and to look after their next generation similarly.”).
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indifferent concerning the precise composition of the resource base that is bequeathed to
future generations.
The assumption that intergenerational equity can be addressed through the
transfer of an unspecified resource base deserves more scientific attention than
discounting proponents tend to provide. After all, many physical scientists who have
addressed the environmental sustainability question are far less sanguine than economists
and other social scientists. Indeed, during the lead-up to the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, the
National Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society of London issued an unprecedented
joint statement, entitled “Population Growth, Resource Consumption, and a Sustainable
World.” The statement observed that
[s]cientific and technological innovations, such as in agriculture, have
been able to overcome many pessimistic predictions about resource
constraints affecting human welfare. Nevertheless, the present patterns of
human activity accentuated by population growth should make even those
most optimistic about future scientific progress pause and reconsider the
wisdom of ignoring these threats to our planet. Unrestrained resource
consumption for energy production and other uses, especially if the
developing world strives to achieve living standards based on the same
levels of consumption as the developed world, could lead to catastrophic
outcomes for the global environment.30
An even more strident pre-Rio statement organized by the Union of Concerned
Scientists was endorsed by over 1,700 scientists, including a majority of the living Nobel
laureates in the sciences. The statement began
Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human
activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment
and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put
at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and
animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable
to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are
urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring
about.31
The fact that social scientists continue to adhere to the perfect substitutability
assumption in the face of concerns such as these is probably not attributable to a
disregard by them for the knowledge and credibility of natural scientists. Instead, it likely
originates from a fear that accepting the natural scientists’ position would undermine the
30

See The Royal Society of London and the National Academy of Sciences, Population Growth,
Resource Consumption, and a Sustainable World (1992).
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http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/about/1992-world-scientists-warning-to-humanity.html.
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liberal project of avoiding government arbitration among competing conceptions of the
good (or the related economic project of avoiding interpersonal welfare comparisons).32
After all, even liberal theorists such as John Rawls, who otherwise favor the distribution
of certain primary goods to individuals as a matter of right, tend to back off of resourcist
approaches in the intergenerational context. Rawls’s “just savings” principle of
intergenerational justice, for instance, required each generation only to contribute to an
accumulation of capital that would “make possible the conditions needed to establish and
to preserve a just basic structure over time,”33 not necessarily to preserve this or that
resource for the benefit of future generations.
Had Rawls pursued further the question of whether the just savings principle
could be satisfied through transfer of a relatively undifferentiated resource base—as
opposed to resource transfers dictated by more specific ecological needs and
constraints—he might have come to perceive that the problems of environmental
sustainability and intergenerational justice represent a serious challenge to liberal
agnosticism on competing accounts of the good.34 To give just one illustration, the desire
to preserve living coral reefs for enjoyment and appreciation by future generations would
seem to require immediate and drastic changes to the lifestyles of the currently living,
given that current food, transportation, energy, agriculture, and land use patterns
associated with those lifestyles threaten both directly and indirectly the survival of all
living coral reefs on the planet.35 In other words, it does not appear that society can have
it all, at least not in a sustainable manner. Thus, so long as affluent consumers continue to
regard their conception of the good as being dependent on the acquisition of more and
better goods, liberalism would seem to be in conflict with the needs and interests of
future generations.
Finally, the opportunity costs defense of discounting suffers from what is
arguably a logical error: Proponents of discounting hinge the decision whether to
conserve natural resources for future generations on the size of the opportunity cost that
is entailed by conservation, when in fact much of environmental policymaking is better
conceived of as being determinative of—rather than determined by—the market rates of
return that embody such opportunity costs. That is, if the savings rate for fossil fuels,
32

See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 2109 (2005).
33

JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 159 (2001).
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Elsewhere, Rawls stated that “[e]ach generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it most also put aside
in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation.” RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note __, at 285. This statement seems to imply a worldview in which preserving “the gains of culture
and civilization” need not come at any cost to present ways of living. Ronald Dworkin similarly suggests
that liberals can properly favor conservation out of a desire to preserve the ability of future generations to
revere and recreate in natural areas. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60
(Michael Sandel ed., 1984). Like Rawls, Dworkin fails to acknowledge that the desire to preserve particular
cultural or natural resources for future generations may place serious limitations on a liberal government’s
ability to afford present individuals wide scope for self-determination and private flourishing.
35
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arable soil, freshwater, wetlands, and other forms natural capital in part determines the
rate of return for all capital—if, in other words, the decision whether to conserve natural
resources influences the size of the opportunity cost that supposedly determines whether
or not it is optimal to conserve—then the justification for discounting by market rates of
return is circular.
Samida and Weisbach attempt to avoid this problem of circularity by citing, but
not describing, an explanation from John Broome’s important article on discounting.36
Broome’s explanation actually turns out only to be an assertion; namely, his assertion that
“[i]t is a fair approximation to think of . . . interest rates as given independently of
decisions about saving.”37 In other words, Broome assumes that interest rates reflect “the
relative values people attach to present and future commodities,”38 rather than a much
more complex combination of private actions and public policies, including many of the
same public policies that supposedly are best addressed by comparison to interest rates.
Moreover, by relying on Broome’s response to the circularity critique, Samida and
Weisbach have smuggled back into their argument the pure rate of time preference
argument that they attempted to disclaim at the outset of their piece.39 Thus, they now
must offer an affirmative argument in favor of treating one generation’s impatience as a
guidepost for its moral responsibilities to another generation, precisely the argument that
Richard Revesz and others have shown to be elusive.40
To be sure, the circularity of the opportunity costs defense of discounting may not
be especially problematic for decisions of modest practical impact, in which the ultimate
outcome might not be affected by the specification of a different reference case of
resource rights and rate of return. But it seems clearly inappropriate for addressing the
type of substantial, long-term issues like climate change and energy policy that motivate
critics of discounted CBA. In that respect, commentators may be too optimistic in their
view of what counts as a general equilibrium or global problem, as opposed to a partial
equilibrium or local problem. For instance, although Heal recognizes the endogeneity
associated with using market rates of interest to determine resource policies,41 he argues
that it is still appropriate to use the market rate of interest for “a purely local decision,
such as the conservation of a local fishery or forest.”42 But even this limited use of
market rates of discount still could lead to an intolerable general equilibrium, if the same
reasoning is independently applied to a series of seemingly “local” projects across the
economy. Over the past half century, after all, a series of “local” fishery collapses
accumulated into a state of pervasive crisis in the world’s oceans.43
36

See John Broome, Discounting the Future, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 128, 140 (1994). See
Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 3]. See supra text accompanying note __.
37
Id.
38
Id.
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See Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 3].
40
See supra text accompanying note __.
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Heal, supra note __ [Draft at 7, 11].
42
Id. at __ [Draft at 10].
43
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Kaplow also recognizes the endogeneity problem, but argues that the effects for
most projects “are likely to be very small (short of radical, worldwide shifts).”44 But it is
an empirical question how significantly environmental policy and market rates of interest
would be impacted if policymakers heeded the problem of endogeneity. Considering the
current level of environmentally harmful subsidization that exists within most
industrialized economies,45 it seems at least plausible that “radical, worldwide shifts” in
policy are precisely what is needed before the endogeneity problem can safely be ignored
in the manner suggested by Kaplow. After all, there is no objective or free market price
that can be identified for nonrenewable and exhaustible resources such as oil or timber—
resources that nevertheless lie at the foundation of a substantial portion of all economic
activity in industrialized countries. In the theoretical literature, the standard wisdom
regarding such resources is that the net returns from their extraction should be reinvested
in reproducible capital in order to ensure sustainability and intergenerational equity.46 But
analysts must have some prior notion of the shadow price of exhaustible resources in
order to determine the amount of reinvestment required. That notion, in turn, requires
making judgments about the policy features of an idealized economy in which “various
components of . . . ecological capital” are maintained above “critical threshold levels
which are stipulated to be preserved to ensure system resilience”47—precisely the kinds
of judgments that welfare economists instead want to subject to discounted CBA using
current, unsustainable market prices.
In short, the need to directly address intergenerational resource equity cannot be
avoided: Even thought experiments involving perfect futures markets and zero
transaction costs face the problem of establishing the initial endowment of resources
between generations. That is, every distribution of resources between generations gives
rise to a different market equilibrium, including within that equilibrium a resultant market
rate of interest that reflects the opportunity cost of capital.48 Because much of
environmental law and policymaking is concerned precisely with the question of resource
distribution among generations, it does not make sense to hinge such policymaking on the
existing discount rate.
44

Kaplow, supra note __ [Draft at 26].
See generally OECD, Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Policy Issues and Challenges (2002).
46
See John Hartwick, Intergenerational Equity And The Investing Of Rents From Exhaustible
Resources, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 972, 973–74 (1977).
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P.K. RAO, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMICS AND POLICY 105 (2000).
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Analysts identify this contingency when they discuss the possibility of using a contractualist
approach to determining the content of intergenerational justice, yet they seem not to recognize how
seriously the contingency limits the normativity of the results of any particular cost-benefit maximization
exercise. See, e.g., Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 17] (“[I]t is necessary to identify some
entitlements on the part of both [present and future generations], setting the background against which they
might bargain. To be plausible, any such specification will inevitably have to depend on an independent
normative account of some kind, and that independent account, rather than a notion of intergenerational
bargaining as such, will be doing the crucial work.”); Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 13]
(observing that “it is difficult to even imagine a bargain [between generations] because the ethical
discussion is about the rights and responsibilities of each generations and without a background set of
rights and responsibilities, there cannot easily be a bargain”).
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II. DISCOUNTING LIVES
On top of difficulties associated with intergenerational resource distribution,
discounting becomes even more problematic when future impacts of policy proposals
include enhanced human mortality and morbidity. Defenders of discounting tend to
assume that “the value of life (and non-life harms) is properly measured, and that life,
risks to life, and enjoyment of life can be measured in money,”49 believing that this
assumption will allow them to demonstrate the Pareto superiority of intergenerational
discounting separate and apart from problems of valuation. They argue somewhat
defensively that their procedure does not require the discounting of future lives, but rather
only the discounting of “costs and benefits,”50 “people’s willingness to pay to reduce
statistical risks”51 or “a monetary amount equal to the willingness to pay to reduce risks
to life.”52 They insist that “what is being discounted is the monetary value of the risk
itself,” and that the relevant issue is a “technical economics question” and does not
concern “an ethical question about whether discounting is appropriate.”53
These analysts protest too much. The Pareto criterion is normally thought to be
the gold standard among welfarists because it avoids the problem of interpersonal welfare
comparisons.54 That is, each individual herself determines whether she is made better
off—or at least no worse off—by a proposed project. Whatever one thinks of such an
approach for decisionmaking within generations, the framework does not translate
smoothly to decisionmaking between generations for the simple reason that future
generations do not yet exist. Thus, there can be no Pareto criterion in the
intergenerational context, at least not so long as that term is understood to include
individuals themselves determining whether they are made better or worse off by a policy
proposal.55 This is no minor complication: The practice of divining and satisfying the
preference functions of future generations must stand on a normative foothold that is
separate and distinct from that which typically supports intragenerational welfare
approaches. Such a foothold has yet to be identified.56
49

Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 5].
Samida and Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 10].
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Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 2].
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Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 28].
50
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Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 25].
See Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1791, 1795 (2003) (observing that “the Pareto standard avoids the need for interpersonal comparisons by
giving each individual a veto over changes”).
54

55

See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 9] (“Willingness to pay is the foundation for
valuation, and current willingness to pay can be used to measure both risks that will come to fruition
immediately and risks that will come to fruition in the future.”).
56

Thus, Samida and Weisbach are not correct to state that “[w]hether life or enjoyment can be
measured with money is an interesting problem but it is orthogonal to the issues presented by discounting.”
Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 5]. Unless it is to remain at a level of theoretical abstraction
that is of only marginal practical and intellectual interest, the Pareto standard must be given operability
through the specification of an actual method of determining whether a particular generation is made
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In that respect, the most powerful normative argument for discounting—that it
will leave future generations with a more valuable stock of resources—is embarrassed by
the fact that some members of those future generations are sacrificed in favor of the very
alternative investments that are supposed to inure to their benefit. At times, this
embarrassment seems to be clear to all but the CBA proponent himself. One prominent
discussion of CBA and climate change, for instance, included the claim that “whether
future generations will accept an increase in the rate of skin cancer or not depends upon
what they get in exchange for it.”57 Likewise, Samida and Weisbach assert that “[i]f we
could ask future generations whether they would want us to engage in this project, they
would prefer that we just invest the money at the market rate of return because they
would be better off with such an investment.”58
But notice what has happened through these rhetorical gestures: The authors have
subtly shifted from an individualist to a collectivist conception of the relevant interestholder, such that the same entity (“future generations”) that incurs the costs of increased
mortality also appears to be the one that receives compensation for the loss.59 In both
instances, future generations are deemed to be the relevant interest-holder, but the costbenefit valuation exercise that led to the imposition of increased risk of death proceeded
on the basis on an individualistic assessment of welfare. This conceptual shift from the
individual to the collective perspective can entail the absurd result that future generations
appear to be “better off” even when they have been rendered extinct.60 That is, nothing
within the framework excludes the possibility that it would be “efficient” or “welfaremaximizing” to kill off every single member of a future generation such that humanity
ceases to exist, while the stock of capital that makes them “better off” continues to grow
exponentially in bank accounts that will never be withdrawn.61
All the discounting proponent really demonstrates by appealing to opportunity
costs is the fact that a life lost in the future may be compensated for at lower cost than a
“better” or “worse off” by a policy proposal. Thus, Samida and Weisbach’s refusal to make such a
specification means that, like other prominent defenders of welfare economic analysis such as Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, their argument borders closely on the tautological. See Jules Coleman, The
Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L. J. 1511 (2003) (reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) and arguing that its central normative claim—“that welfare, and not
fairness, is the standard appropriate to assessing the law”—is supported only by “empty tautological claims
and underdeveloped putative causal explanations”).
57

E. Neumayer, Global Warming: Discounting Is Not the Issue, But Sustainability Is, 27 ENERGY
POLICY 33 (1999).
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Cf. supra text accompanying notes __-__ (describing a similar conceptual slide with respect to
the pure rate of time preference justification for discounting).
60

Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, The Accidental Environmentalist: Judge Posner on Catastrophic Thinking,
94 GEO. L. J. 833, 857 (2006).
61
See Cowen, supra note __, at __ [Draft at 6-7] (“Under a positive discount rate, no matter how
long, one life today can be worth more than one million lives in the future, or worth the entire subsequent
survival of the human race, if we use a long enough time horizon.”).
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life lost today. The decision actually to sacrifice the life—and thereby to bring about a
situation in which compensation becomes relevant—remains an entirely separate, and
philosophically more problematic, matter.62 The potential for confusion in this area is
evident in Samida and Weisbach’s response to Derek Parfit’s famous deformity example,
in which Parfit argued that the harm associated with genetic deformities—as opposed to
the ability to provide financial compensation for them—does not vary with time.63
Samida and Weisbach counter that discounting future deformities to a present value
nevertheless is appropriate because “the cost of care of or cure for deformities is likely to
go down over time.”64
Even on its own terms, this argument is weakened when evaluated from the
standpoint of actual well-being, as opposed to the monetary equivalents of well-being.
That is because the same economic forces that purportedly enable a present generation to
set aside a lesser amount today to compensate for a harm tomorrow also imply that the
amount required to compensate for a harm tomorrow will be greater, due to the declining
marginal utility of wealth, commodities, and other tangible forms of compensation.
Samida and Weisbach instead argue that “[s]tubbing one’s toe remains stubbing one’s
toe” even with rising income, so long as the discount rate is set equal to “the expected
long-run economic growth” of the society.65 But their argument depends on a host of
undefended assumptions regarding the ability to translate well-being into money and to
commensurate all potential sources and levels of well-being with each other. The
monetary equivalent of stubbing one’s toe only remains proportionate with rising income
if the pain of stubbing one’s toe can be monetized in the same fashion as any other good,
and if the “monetary equivalent” of pain behaves similarly to those other goods as
income shifts and time progresses. Whatever the validity of this depiction for toestubbing, it is implausible for death and other extreme inflictions of harm, where the
moral and psychological weight of the injury caused to future individuals may bear little
relationship to the long-run economic growth rate.66
More fundamentally, Samida and Weisbach misstate the nature of the
intergenerational policymaking challenge: The moral question on the table is not how
efficiently to care for or cure a deformity that has already been suffered. The question
instead is whether to inflict the harm in the first place. By presuming that there is no
difference between living as a non-deformed individual and living as a compensated
individual with a deformity, the authors violate the most fundamental ethical precept, that
62

See SPASH, supra note __, at 241 (“If future generations are to be losers then an explicit
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commodities as compensation. A future deformity will require a greater quantity of future commodities,
because the future deformity is just as bad as the present one, but the future commodities are less
valuable.”).
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individuals should not be used without their consent as means, rather than as ends. This is
why in the intergenerational context one cannot separate the issue of discounting from
valuation, from the issue of whether and how to monetize life. This is why asserting that
“[o]nce risk has been monetized, it has been translated into money, and may be
discounted as such,”67 simply pushes the important moral decision back one step in the
analysis, to the question of valuation. It is one thing, in other words, to presume
individualized consent to environmental, health, and safety risks based on revealed
preference studies within the current generation.68 It is quite another to presume such
consent among individuals who have neither vote nor voice nor volition to leave our
political community and its sphere of impact.
III. DISCOUNTING ALTERNATIVES
Nothing in the foregoing analysis is intended to suggest that analysts are not right
to be focusing on opportunity costs, only that such costs should not be compounded into
the cost-benefit exercise in a mechanical fashion without first asking important normative
questions about intergenerational justice. In what remains the most thoughtful discussion
of discounting in the environmental law literature, Richard Revesz concludes that
intergenerational decisionmaking should “take account of” opportunity costs, but not be
dictated by a particular discount rate. Samida and Weisbach argue that Revesz is
“incorrect” to think that there is a distinction between these two positions.69 Later, they
report that they “fail to see how one mathematical procedure can present different moral
issues than another identical mathematical procedure.”70 These arguments miss their
mark, for they presume a kind of calculative compulsion that Revesz specifically rejects.
Not all rationality is formalized, and despite the frequent claim that cost-benefit analysis
is desirable because it encourages comprehensive assessment of outcomes, it is in fact
only formalized systems such as cost-benefit analysis that must, by their very nature, be
incomplete. As Gödel famously demonstrated, no formal system of minimal complexity
can be both consistent and complete.71
Revesz recognizes this unavoidable dilemma and chooses to sacrifice consistency
by viewing opportunity costs as but one factor in a pluralistic assessment of
intergenerational obligation. CBA proponents choose to sacrifice completeness by
exogenizing the background state of intergenerational rights and responsibilities through
the use of a discount rate that presumes such questions of equity already have been
addressed. Thus, through discounting, the fundamental issues of intergenerational
equity—which risks and resources, as an ethical matter, should be imposed or bestowed
67
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on future generations?—is conflated with the issue of intergenerational efficiency—
which generation, as a technical matter based on a given rate of discount and distribution
of entitlements, does or will derive more utility from the use of a resource? Future
generations, in essence, are forced to outbid present owners by an amount reflecting not
only the strength of their needs, but also the alternative uses to which all resources—
including the “monetary equivalents” of their own lives—could be put during the
intervening time periods. This is conceptual confusion. Even if transfers of resources to
future generations are offered as “compensation” for this bidding disparity, the
discounting procedure still suffers from a basic flaw: The efficiency exercise that
determines the amount of compensation due will have proceeded on the basis of a
discount rate that assumes away the hard work of evaluating intergenerational equity.
Defenders of cost-benefit analysis at times recognize the need to begin this hard
work. Viscusi, for instance, observes in passing that “we do not know what [future
generations] preferences are.”72 Similarly, at one point Samida and Weisbach state that
“[i]f respecting future generations means anything, it should mean respecting our best
guess as to their wishes and helping them as much as feasible.”73 But nowhere do the
analysts actually engage the question of what “our best guess as to their wishes” is, or
how we might go about constructing and operationalizing a process to divine and satisfy
those wishes. Instead, they seem to simply assume that future generations will have the
same needs and desires as we do, and that their interests may be discounted as if they
belonged entirely to the present generation. This is an odd approach: The one thing we do
know from climate change is that the future will be vastly different from the present. The
preferences of future generations undoubtedly will reflect these environmental changes,
making those preferences quite different from our own. Thus, in order to truly respect
future generations’ interests, we must undertake an engaged effort to anticipate and
consider the details of their plight, and to provide the specific institutions and resources
that they will need in order to endure it.
This is the challenge that the sustainable development policymaking paradigm
seeks to address,74 a challenge that seems underappreciated by proponents of discounted
CBA. Viscusi, for instance, refers to sustainability as “an ill-defined environmentalist
battle cry.”75 He argues that the goal of maintaining a sustainable level of wellbeing over
time is undesirable because it may deprive current generations of a “large current benefit”
if the benefit happens to impose “a very small risk that the quality of life for some future
generation might be an infinitesimal amount lower than our own.”76 Yet the existence of
such an extreme mathematical scenario does not undermine the importance of
maintaining a sustainable level of well-being; rather, it underscores the importance of not
conflating moral and political judgment with mathematical reflex. Viscusi also argues
72
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that the goal of sustainability is impractical because “[w]e don’t know the absolute levels
of [future generations’] quality of life, how much our decisions will alter that quality, or
how we might go about making a sensible intertemporal interpersonal comparison.”77 Yet
the fact that we do not know the answers to these profound questions does not render
them moot; rather, it makes the need to address them all the more urgent.
In that respect, one final danger of discounted CBA needs to be mentioned.
Moderate defenders of CBA are careful to point out that they do not intend the CBA
exercise to displace entirely other policy considerations such as distributive equity. They
simply believe that such considerations should be addressed separately from efficiency
analysis, typically through the all-purpose vehicle of the tax and transfer system. Sunstein
and Rowell, for instance, claim that “[w]hatever the proper approach to intergenerational
equity, the debate over that issue should be separated from the debate over discounting,
and the former debate should be engaged directly.”78 Elsewhere they state with respect to
intergenerational resource allocation that “however that sort of allocation should ideally
be made or is in fact determined, all further consideration of intergenerational dimensions
of policies – whether involving the environment, infrastructure, research and
development, education, or social security – dissolves almost entirely into matters of
efficiency.”79
The underlying conceptual problems raised by Gödel’s Incompleteness
Theroem,80 however, may haunt even those who defend CBA in this more pragmatic
sense. The problem lies in the fact that the formal language of the cost-benefit framework
is not only irreducibly incomplete; it also is capable of denying its own incompleteness.81
That is, even as CBA’s moderate proponents depict the procedure as but one tool in an
overall suite of policy approaches, CBA implicitly and unavoidably condemns those
other approaches as undesirable. The tautological conclusion of the formalized welfarist
framework is that justice and fairness necessarily derograte from efficiency and welfare.
That is, intergenerational equity can only be achieved at the apparent cost of welfaremaximization, at least so long as analysts and observers remain fixed to the status quo
distribution of rights and resources as an efficiency baseline. Little wonder, then, that
practitioners of CBA attempt to awkwardly subsume the equity interests of future
generations into the efficiency maximization calculus, as this Comment has argued is
done by discounting. That approach seems to preserve the nominal comprehensiveness
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and optimality of CBA results without revealing that those results are radically contingent
on the acceptability of the status quo distribution of rights and resources.
At bottom, the disagreement between defenders and critics of discounting arises
from a difference of view over what constitutes an interesting question. With respect to
climate change, for instance, a policy approach that focuses on equitable considerations
would ask first whether future generations are entitled to a minimal level of climate
stability and freedom from catastrophic harm. Only after that question had forthrightly
and courageously been answered would questions of welfare-maximization and
discounted CBA even become relevant, let alone interesting. To holders of this
perspective, the tendency to narrowly focus on technical aspects of the cost-benefit
methodology—while ignoring or burying in footnotes the need to also address the
equitable distribution of rights and resources across human generations—seems rather
like fiddling with deck chairs . . . on stilts.
________
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